Abstract. Wallets with observers were suggested by David Chaum and have previously been described in Ch92] and CP92]. These papers argue that a particular combination of a tamper-resistant-unit and a small computer controlled by the user is very suitable as a personal device in consumer transaction systems. Using such devices, protocols are constructed that, simultaneously, achieve high levels of security for organizations and anonymity for individual users. The protocols from CP92] o er anonymity to users, under the assumption that the information stored by observers is never revealed to the outside world. This paper extends CP92] by de ning additional requirements for the protocols which make it impossible to trace the behaviour of individuals in the system if one is also allowed to analyze a posteriori the information observers can collect. We propose two protocols satisfying our requirements, thus achieving a higher degree of privacy for individuals. This extra level of privacy is obtained at essentially no cost as the new protocols have the same complexity as those previously proposed.
Introduction
In Cha83], the notion of blind signatures was proposed and used to construct an on-line electronic payment scheme for anonymous payments. Later, Even and Goldreich (see EG84]) suggested an o -line electronic payment scheme in which the security relied on a tamper-resistant unit. However, such units inherently cannot o er proper protection of the individual's privacy as the unit in principle can send a lot of personal information to the counterpart during a transaction. An o -line payment system not depending on tamper-resistance and o ering privacy was presented in CFN90]. In this model (o -line and no tamper-resistant units) the same coin cannot be prevented from being spent several times, but CFN90] solved this problem by guaranteeing that any person who spends a coin more than once would be identi ed.
Thus, as noted by Chaum in Ch92], in o -line transactions a solution based on tamper-resistance can give good security but no satisfactory solution to the privacy aspect, whereas cryptographic solutions without tamper-resistant units although o ering good privacy cannot prevent \double-spending". Therefore it was suggested in Ch92] to obtain the best from these two worlds by combining the two approaches. This is done in an electronic wallet consisting of a small computer, trusted by the individual, and a tamper-resistant unit, called an observer. These observers are issued by a special issuing authority (ia) and are trusted by this authority. As the observer may contain (sensitive) information about the user, it is important for privacy reasons that the observer cannot communicate with the outside world (neither during the transactions nor when the observer is not used). During transactions all communication between an observer and the outside world (e.g. the organizations individuals do business with) therefore passes through the user's computer. As part of the protocols, this computer must ensure that the data transmitted to and from the observer contain no (Shannon) information (except for agreed upon messages). This is called \prevention of in ow and out ow". In CP92], protocols are presented which satisfy this requirement.
In order to be able to recognize observers, these are equipped with a digital signature set-up. This so-called native signature scheme is used to prove that the user has a genuine observer. However, the native scheme cannot be used directly, as it would identify the observer (and thereby the user) in each transaction. Instead the native scheme is used to obtain a validator at a Validator Issuing Center (vic). A validator consists of a secret key and a public key, together with a signature by vic on the public key. One of the central ideas behind validators is that vic doesn't know which validator it issues (vic makes a blind signature), so that the wallet can later use it to sign messages that cannot be traced back to the user. Furthermore, the user (more precisely the user's computer) and the observer must cooperate in order to sign messages with respect to the public key of the validator. Such a signature therefore signals to the receiver that the observer (which the receiver is assumed to trust) has acknowledged the validity of the message.
Each validator can be used to sign multiple messages. Any other party can be sure that two messages signed with the same validator originated from the same observer. By using di erent validators at di erent times, the user can prevent linking.
As the protocols of getting and using a validator are the central components of most applications of wallets with observers, we concentrate on these two protocols in this paper. Such a pair of protocols will be called a validator scheme.
In CP92] a validator scheme is proposed where unlinkability of a users transactions is based on the assumption that the observer's contents are never revealed. However, assuming an environment of mutual distrust and cheating, observers could be designed in such a way that their contents can be accessed by ia (using a secret trapdoor) in case it has complete physical control over the observer (either by means of stealing, or because of maintenance procedures). In Section 3 we present protocols where the executions of the signing protocol (unconditionally) cannot be linked to the user even if the contents of the observer is known to all organizations (including ia and vic). First, however, Section 2 describes the set-up in more details and gives the necessary de nitions.
The results in this paper are also presented in BCCFP92]. Furthermore, to avoid misunderstandings it must be mentioned that the protocols were already presented by David Chaum as part of the presentation of CP92] at Crypto'92. However, the protocols are not included in that paper. The contribution of this paper is to introduce the notion of shared information and to present the criteria according to which the protocols were constructed.
Security of Protocols Involving Observers
This section discuss the basic principles of wallets with observers, and the security of the basic protocols is de ned.
Tracing an Observer if its Contents Are Known.
When considering the privacy of the user we must assume that the observer stores whatever information can be collected from the transactions. In the validator issuing protocol of CP92], observers know exactly which particular validator is being issued. When the validator is later used in a validator-based signature scheme to sign messages, the observer is able to link the execution of the validator-based signature scheme to that of the issuing protocol. Furthermore, the observer's native signatures, used in the issuing protocol, uniquely link vic's views of the executions of the issuing protocol to the observer's views of that protocol. As the receiver of a validator-based signature knows the public key of the validator (and vic's signature on it), the receiver's view of the execution of the validator-based signature scheme, can be linked to the observer's view of the same protocol. Consequently, if the contents of an observer are ever known to the outside world, its behaviour can be completely recovered (see Figure 1 ). Linking observers with individuals is just a practical matter. So in a scenario in which the contents of (some of) the observers may become available to the outside world, the anonymity of individuals in the system faces serious threats.
Moreover, this attack, which was based on the fact that the observer knows which particular validator is involved in each transaction, can be generalized: Observer VIC Recipient 1 ) P P P P P P P P P q P P P P P P P P P i ? any transaction data that arises from the interaction between organizations and the wallet and is known by both observer and recipient can be used to establish the described links. Hence, when designing the protocols such data (called shared information) must be avoided.
De nitions
In view of the above attack we now describe additional criteria for the protocols, which, roughly speaking, require that the public key of validators be unconditionally hidden from observers and that the validator-based signature scheme prevents shared information (except for the message, m, to be signed). As the observer and the receiver in general must know the message, it should be chosen from a sparse set such that each message is likely to be signed by many di erent wallets. This prevents that m can be used to link transactions. 4 Recall that a validator scheme consists of a pair of protocols. One, the validator issuing protocol, results in the user and her observer getting a validator, and the other, the validator signing protocol, can be used to make signatures with respect to the public key of the validator. We trust that this informal description is su cient here.
First note that the validator issuing as well as the signing protocol are threeparty protocols involving observer and user plus either vic or the receiver of the signature. In this extended abstract we leave out a precise de nition of our model. Brie y, each participant is modeled by an interactive probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine as in GMR89]. In some places dishonest participants may have unlimited computing power, but this should be clear from the context. The user will be called Alice and her observer will be denoted by oa.
In order to capture what a participant learns from such a protocol we use the notion of views introduced in GMR89].
De nition1. For any execution of a protocol and for any participating party, X, which has input i x , the view of X, view X (i x ), is the set of all the messages that X sees plus all the random choices that X makes. A validator scheme will be said to protect the privacy of the user, if whenever the user follows her protocol it is impossible for an unlimited powerful entity to nd any information regarding which signature corresponds to which execution of the validator issuing protocol, even with all the information of vic, the recipient of the signature, and the observer. The following de nition expresses this informally in terms of views.
De nition2. Let a validator scheme be given, and let R denote the recipient of the signature. Let a message, m, be given. The scheme prevents shared information if whenever Alice follows the issuing and signing protocols (when signing m) then no matter what unlimited powerful vic, oa and R do in the protocols, the (distribution of the) view of R (when receiving a signature on m) is independent of the combined views of vic and oa (the views of the observer in both protocols).
This de nition basically says that the receiver of the signature may not be able to obtain any information which can be linked to the observer. Namely, if such information exists the receivers view of the signature scheme can be linked to the observer, and the observer can easily link its view of the protocol to the corresponding validator issuing protocol (see also Section 2.1).
Requirements for the Validator Scheme
In light of the above de nitions we now list the properties that the validator issuing and the signature protocol must have in order to be secure as well as protect the privacy of the user. The validator issuing protocol must have the following properties:
1. It must not be feasible for a cheating user to obtain a validator for which she knows the secret key herself (i.e., vic must be ascertained that a valid observer is taking part). 2. vic's signature scheme and the application of it in the validator issuing protocol must be secure, such that Alice (even if she breaks the observer) is unable to forge signatures. 3. No (Shannon) information ows between the observer and vic (if Alice follows the protocol). This is true even if oa and vic both have unlimited computing power (i.e., no in ow/out ow). 4. Only Alice knows the public key of the validator and vic's signature on it (both should be unconditionally hidden from vic and oa, see also requirement 5 to the validator signing scheme below). 5. OA and Alice each get a part of the secret key of the validator from vic, such that they can only use the secret key by cooperating. It is in properties 4 and 5 that our issuing scheme di ers from that given in CP92]. These properties ensure that the observer and Alice share the control over the validator, while the observer doesn't know the public key of the validator. The rst requirement ensures that Alice is not able to acquire a validator for herself. If she were able to do so, then she could dispense with the observer and run all the other protocols herself without the help of an observer (see also point 3 below).
The signature scheme based on validators must have the following properties (we often refer to the recipient as the veri er):
1. If Alice and oa cooperate they can make a signature on a given message with respect to the public key of their validator. 2. If Alice follows the protocols, then it is not feasible for oa, vic and the veri er to execute the validator issuing protocol and the signing protocol (several times) in such a way that they are able to learn the secret key of Alice.
3. If oa and vic both follow the validator issuing protocol, then it is not feasible for Alice to execute this protocol and subsequent signing protocols in such a way that she can sign a message which the observer is not willing to sign. 4. In order to avoid replay, the veri er will be interactive in the protocol. 5. The validator scheme must prevent shared information (De nition 2). The rst four requirements are related to the security of the validator signing protocol, while the last refers to the privacy obtained by the validator scheme.
The Protocols
This section presents a validator scheme, which satis es the requirements outlined above. The protocols work for every group of prime order q. For the sake of concreteness we take a prime order subgroup of Z Z p , where p is a prime. All protocols are based on the certi ed discrete logarithm problem. More precisely, it is assumed to be hard to compute discrete logarithms modulo a prime, p, even if the factorization of p ? 1 is given.
The Basic Signatures
The protocols in this paper use the signature scheme presented in CP92]. We now brie y describe this scheme. Let two primes p and q be given such that q divides p ? 1, and let g 2 Z Z p be an element of order q. The group generated by g is denoted by G q .
The secret key is x 2 Z Z q and the public key is The reader is referred to CP92] for a discussion of the security of this signature scheme. In that paper it is argued that it is hard to forge signatures, and that the signer does not give away any information about his secret key except m x . This is made more precise in the following assumption:
Assumption1. When the signer signs a message, he does not make it computationally easier to compute any function of x, than if he just gives away m x . Assumption2. If it is possible to make a signature (z; c; r) on a message m with respect to the public key h = g x then z = m x .
The second assumption can be justi ed as follows. If z 6 = m x , then for every pair (a; b) there is at most one c 2 Z Z q for which there exists an r 2 Z Z q such that the signature is valid. Hence, if z 6 = m x the forger must hope that the image of H is exactly this c. However, if the output of H is \hard to control" this seems extremely unlikely.
Blind Signatures
To get a blind signature on the message m 2 G q one chooses a random t 2 Z Z q and asks the signer to sign m 0 = mg t . Let z 0 = m 0 x . The signer then proves that log g h = log m0 z 0 in such a way that the messages are blinded: The following assumption makes precise which signatures the veri er can obtain when executing the blind signature protocol:
Assumption3. On input m 0 to the above blind signature protocol, the veri er can only obtain a blind signature on a message m 2 G q if he knows s; t 2 Z Z q such that m = m s 0 g t . This assumption can be justi ed as follows. Assumption 2 implies that z = m x and hence log m b = log g a:
Thus the veri er must be able to compute m x from m x 0 . This is presumably di cult unless m is a product of elements for which the x'th power is known. 
Signatures by oa
In CP92] it is shown how this signature scheme can be used by the observer such that it cannot send any information to or receive any information from the veri er (i.e., without causing in ow of out ow). This scheme can therefore be used as the native signature scheme.
Validator Issuing
We now turn to the problem of creating a validator. The public key is going to be a number h 2 G q such that the corresponding secret key, log g h, is of the form s + t mod q, where only oa knows t and only Alice knows s. Furthermore, Alice will obtain a (blind) signature from vic on h.
Before this protocol can start, the native public key and the certi cate on it are sent to Alice and vic. vic has a private key x and a public key H = G x where G 6 = g and G is a generator of G q such that Alice does not know log g G (hence, (G; H) will replace (g; h) when the blind signature scheme is used to issue a validator).
vic will use the blind signature scheme when signing the public part of the validator. The resulting protocol to acquire a validator is:
1. Alice chooses j; s 2 Z Z q at random, computes := g s G j and sends this to oa (s is Alice's part of the secret key, and G j blinds it).
2. oa chooses a random t 2 Z Z q and sends := g t to Alice (s + t is the secret key).
3. Alice computes the public key h := g s and chooses k 2 Z Z q uniformly at random. She then computes the blinded public key B := hG j+k and sends k to oa. 4. oa computes B := G k and a signature, (B), on B using its native signature scheme. oa sends the signature to Alice. u t This protocol can in a natural way be split in two parts. In the rst part (corresponding to step 1{4) Alice and oa choose a public key h = g s+t , where Alice knows s and oa knows t. In the second part vic signs this public key.
The rst part can very well be performed o -line before the user contacts vic. Furthermore, the computation of expressions of the form a d b e mod p, where a; b 2 G q and d; e 2 Z Z q requires only a little more work than a single exponentiation (less than 2jqj multiplications in G q ), see BC90, B92] . Hence, the on-line computation needed by the user is just a little more than 5 exponentiations in G q , whereas vic requires 3 exponentiations and a signature veri cation (which again requires approximately 2 exponentiations, if the scheme from Section 3.3 is used as the native scheme).
The next proposition says that the key selection part is secure for Alice independently of the computing power of oa (so that requirement 4 of the validator issuing protocol is satis ed) Proposition6. If Alice follows the protocol then no matter what an unlimited powerful cheating observer and center do, they cannot (even together) obtain any Shannon information about the validator.
Proof. Given a view of oa and a view of vic it is su cient to show that for all h 2 G g and for all signatures on h there is exactly one possible choice of s; j; k; u; v by Alice such that oa and vic would get these views when issuing a validator on h.
Except u t
Supposing the native signature scheme prevents in ow and out ow this proof also implies that observer and center cannot use the protocol as a subliminal channel of information, so that requirement 3 of the validator issuing protocol is satis ed.
Finally we have to consider the security for the organization. In other words we want to show that no polynomially bounded userÃ can get a validator of a public key for which she knows the corresponding secret key. Assume therefore that oa and vic both follow the prescribed protocol, and recall that B is the blinded public key, which oa signs.
First note that Assumption 3 implies thatÃ cannot get a signature on a number h for which log g h is known unless she knows a pair (d; e) such that B = g d G e . The following proposition shows thatÃ cannot know such a pair unless it is easy to compute log g G.
Proposition7
. Let denote the probability thatÃ can nd a pair (e; d) such that B = g d G e (over the random coins of oa, vic andÃ). If is greater than the inverse of some polynomial for p and q su ciently large, then there is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm for nding log g G. Proof. The idea is only sketched. Recall, that none of the participants need to know log g G. Hence, they may all be cooperate in order to nd this logarithm. Consider the following algorithm, which uses the methods ofÃ, oa and vic.
1.Ã computes . 
If
Step 9 is reached the algorithm will output f = log g G with probability at least 1?1=q (namely, if d?t 6 = d 0 ?a). Next it is shown that this step is reached with probability at least 1 8 3 , thus completing the proof.
For a given 2 G q let p denote the probability thatÃ nds the pair (d; e)
given is chosen in the rst step (over the random coins of all three parties).
Let Prob ] denote the probability thatÃ chooses . Then
Let E denote the set f 2 G q jp =2g.
Step 9 will be reached with probability u t
Note that this shows that requirements 1 and 6 for the validator issuing protocol are satis ed.
Regarding requirement 2 the reader is referred to CP92] for a discussion of the basic proof and the security of the blind signature protocol. It is argued that it is di cult to forge a signature after a number of executions of the blind signature protocol.
Validator Signing
It is now shown how Alice and oa can sign a message using the validator obtained above.
It is assumed that Alice initially sends the public key h and the signature on it to the recipient, who then veri es the signature. A message m 2 G q is now By using the same technique as in the blind signature protocol the user can actually obtain a signature on a message of the form m l g n for some l; n 2 Z Z q while the observer believes it signs m. To prevent this a hash-value of m should be used when b 0 and z 0 are computed.
First note that if all three parties follow the protocol then the veri er will end up with a correct signature on m (requirement 1 for the validator based signature scheme).
The purpose of the random string, , is to prevent Alice from just replaying an old signature on m (see footnote 1). Hence requirement 4 to the validator signing protocol is satis ed.
The following proposition shows that Alice does not compromise her privacy by executing this protocol (requirement 5 for the validator based signature scheme).
Proposition8. The validator scheme satis es De nition 2.
Proof. Assume Alice follows the protocols. oa, vic and the veri er may deviate arbitrarily from the protocols, and they may have unlimited computing power.
Let view 1 oa and view 2 oa be the views of oa in the validator issuing and signing protocols, respectively. Let furthermore view vic be the view of vic in the validator issuing protocol and view V be the view of the veri er in a signing protocol.
It is su cient to show that for every triple (view 1 oa ; view 2 oa ; view vic ) belonging together there is exactly one sequence (s; j; k; u; v) such that this triple could correspond to the given view V . This can be done by a straightforward extension of the proof of Proposition 6 and is omitted here. u t
In OO90] a general construction of blind signatures based on divertible proofs is presented. Our blind signature uses the same principles, but it has the further (necessary) property that the observer can see the message without compromising the constraints from De nition 2 (the construction of OO90] does not seem to allow the observer to see m without introducing shared information).
We nally show that it is secure for oa as well as Alice to execute this protocol (requirements 2 and 3 for the validator signing protocol).
